Why Johnny Can't Use Stego: a Human-oriented Perspective on the
  Application of Steganography by Wendzel, Steffen
Why Johnny Can’t Use Stego: a Human-oriented
Perspective on the Application of Steganography
Steffen Wendzel1,2
1 Fraunhofer FKIE, Germany
2 Worms University of Applied Sciences, Germany
Abstract. Steganography is the discipline that deals with concealing the existence of se-
cret communications. Existing research already provided several fundamentals for defining
steganography and presented a multitude of hiding methods and countermeasures for this
research discipline.
Contribution. We identified that no work exists that discusses the process of applying
steganography from an individual’s perspective. This paper presents a phase model that ex-
plains pre-conditions of applying steganography as well as the decision-making process and
the final termination of a steganographic communication. The model can be used to explain
whether an individual can use steganography and to explain whether and why an individual
desires to use steganography. Moreover, the model can be used in research publications to
indicate the addressed model’s phase of scientific contributions. Furthermore, our model can
be used to teach the process of steganography-application to students.
Keywords. Steganography; Information Hiding; Covert Channels; Network Steganography;
Information Security; Usable Security; Human Aspects of Security
1 Introduction
Steganography deals with the concealing of messages. In informal words, steganography can
be defined as the practice of undetectably communicating a message in a cover object [11],
i.e. within a carrier. For instance, one steganographic method represents a secret message in
written notes of a music composition [21].
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The goal of steganography, in comparison to cryptography, is not to hide the content of a
secret message but to hide the existence of a secret message [3]. For this reason, steganography
is applied in domains where a hidden transfer of messages is beneficial, such as to circumvent
Internet censorship, to transfer secret information between spies and in the military context, to
hide illegal data or to perform stealthy malware communications [11, 21, 16, 38, 18]. Hidden
information can be transferred in analog formats, such as in paper letters, but is primarily
embedded into digital media, such image, audio and video files [11, 21, 16]. In addition,
the transfer of hidden information over networks became popular in recent years [18, 39].
Another recent trend in the domain is the embedding of secret information into cyber-physical
systems [32, 13, 30].
Addressed Problem Several hundred works on Steganography have been published in the
last few years. Most of these publications either present new or improved hiding methods or
they present new or improved methods to counter these hiding methods.
In contrast, our recent research addresses fundamentals of this discipline, such as the unified
and comparable description of hiding methods [34] or the evaluation of the novelty and appli-
cability of hiding methods [35]. However, we discovered that another fundamental aspect of
steganography requires a clearer analysis, namely the process of applying steganography from
a human-oriented perspective.
Contribution For this reason, we introduce a phase model that provides a human-
oriented perspective on the application of steganography. It is the first model that
describes all necessary steps an individual has to perform to establish and finalize a covert
communication. Our model can be used to (1) explain why an individual can or cannot use
(or want to use) steganography, (2) as a tool for researchers to clarify which phases of the
model are targetted by their work, and (3) to teach the process of steganography-application
decision-making to students.
Overview This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work. We introduce
our phase model in Section 3 and discuss it in Section 4. A conclusion and a brief outlook on
future work are provided in Section 5.
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2 Related Work
This section highlights related work and distinguishes our work from these existing publications.
An initial terminology for Information Hiding, the discipline of which steganography is con-
sidered a sub-discipline, was collected by Pfitzmann in [22]. Several publications discuss the
origins of steganography, e.g. [11, 21, 16, 38, 18, 15, 39]. These publications mention several use-
cases for steganography-application and, for this reason, shed light on the possible motivations
for applying steganography. However, these works do not add a view on the human-oriented
process for applying steganography behind these use-cases.
Simmons introduced his so-called Prisoner’s Problem that provides the fundamental scenario
in which steganography is applied [27]. In his scenario, two prisoners try to escape jail. For
a successful escape, they need to work together. However, they cannot directly exchange
messages. Instead, the only way to exchange messages is to hand over all messages to a so-called
warden that can read and modify the messages. The prisoners need to apply steganography
so that they can plan their escape without letting the warden notice. Simmons describes a
generalized case of steganography-application that comprises two important elements that we
discuss in our work: the reason that leads to the application of steganography as well as the
decision-making process of the prisoners. Modifications of the Prisoner’s Problem exist, e.g. [6].
In own previous work, we provide a unified description system for steganography hiding
methods [34]. When applied by authors, our description system allows the easier comparison
of hiding methods; it also allows to easily spot what work is lacking for a particular hiding
method, e.g. a capacity estimation or the evaluation of certain types of countermeasures. We
also developed a framework for the evaluation of a hiding method’s creativity [35].1 However,
both works address fundamentals of the discipline but like the abovementioned publications
do not address human aspects.
Zseby et al. provide a testbed designed to teach network covert channels to university
students [41]. In own previous work [33], we designed an educational communication protocol
tailored for teaching the embedding of covert channels into network protocols. Although these
publications address a human aspect (education), they focus on teaching technical details and
not on the individual’s process that leads to the application of steganography.
1In this sense, creativity is a term from Psychology research and defined in terms of novelty and applicability
of a scientific invention [28].
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Brandstetter et al. describe results of a research project (StegIT ) in a book publication [5].
Their project analyses steganography primarily from a social science perspective. Smaldino
et al. analyse the evolution of cooperation via covert signalling [29]. In their work, covert
signalling is a social covert communication, e.g. using jokes or ambiguities in a communication.
The process of applying steganography as we present it in this work was not discussed in these
two publications.
Furthermore, usable security has been heavily addressed in the last ten years, and several
publications stated that increasing usable security is crucial or proposed design goals for usable
security, e.g. cf. [17, 4]. However, researching usable security focuses primarily on analysing and
increasing the usability of information technology. It does not automatically involve research
on a decision-making process or a description of a process that leads to the application of a
particular technology as in case of our paper.
For the domains of web browsing, utilization of authentication methods, or the application
of cryptography methods, user studies were performed, e.g. for PGP in [37, 26]. These publi-
cations address a human aspect but they do not provide a model that addresses the decision-
making process and rather analyse the security of a particular encryption tool. Moreover, these
publications are not focusing on steganography or its tools.
3 A Human-oriented Model for Steganography-Application
In this section, we introduce a human-oriented perspective that describes the phases of applying
steganography from the view of an individual. In our model, steganography is either applied
for self-use (e.g. hiding data in a local computer’s steganographic filesystem) or to covertly
communicate with a peer.2
3.1 Design Principles
Our model was designed by following certain principles to support its acceptance within the
scientific community as well as for supporting its use in higher education. In particular, the
following design principles were applied:
2Here, the term ‘peer’ is referring to any subject desired to be part of a covert communication by the individual.
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• Focus on the Human-oriented Application of Steganography. Instead of devel-
oping a model with several layers (e.g. an interface layer describing a software interface
of tools, a layer for the user, or a technical layer for the functioning of the steganographic
methods), the goal was develop a single-layered human-oriented model only for describing
the process required to apply steganography.
• Simplicity The model kept as untangled as possible to prevent unnecessary complexity
which would not benefit its acceptance or clarity.
• Cross-domain Applicability. Our model is not created with only one steganographic
domain, e.g. digital media steganography, in mind. Instead, it should be applicable to
all domains, from linguistic steganography to cyber-physical systems steganography.
3.2 Model Description and Illustration
We will now describe all phases of our model. The whole model is split into six phases (0–5)
and is visualized in Figure 1. The process starts at the upper left side with phase 0.
Phase 0: Occurrence of a Reason
This is a pre-phase to enter the phase model. Entering the phase is triggered by an external
event or by an intrinsic motivation that provides a reason for a steganographic communication.
In Simmons’ Prisoner’s Problem, the reason is the fact that the prisoners are locked in jails
and possess the desire to escape in a joint-work process.
No individual will apply steganography without an initial reason for its use. Such a reason
can, for instance, be the occurrence of Internet censorship so that two parties are not able
to exchange their political opinions any further. Another reason for the use of steganography
would be to teach steganography to students in higher education. Several additional scenarios
for the application of steganography can be found in [11, 21, 16, 38, 18, 39].
Phase 0 can be reached unknowingly by an individual, e.g. if messages are observed by an
adversary without the knowledge of the individual. A similar reason for reaching phase 0
unknowingly would be if an adversary unnoticeably manipulates the communication between
an individual and a peer via a man-in-the-middle attack, ensuring that only filtered content
reaches the peer.
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Reason for a covert
communication occurs
(e.g. Internet censorship
was set up)
Reason for a covert
communication occurs
(e.g. Internet censorship
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Will for a covert
communication is
formed (either by a
suggestion from
a peer or by a
self-driven decision)
ill for a covert
communication is
formed (either by a
suggestion from
a peer or by a
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No Will for a covert
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formed (e.g. technology
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infeasible
Decision for a covert
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made
Decision for a covert
communication is
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Communication
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(Technical) Infeasi-
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   Phase 0                                        Phase 1                                     Phase 2
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Rejection of
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N
Y
   Phase 3                                        Phase 4                                     Phase 5
Figure 1: Covert Communication Phase Model. This model shows the phases that an individual
has to go through to prepare, perform, and finally terminate a covert communication.
Reasons not to Reach Phase 0: Obviously, the only reason not to reach phase 0 is the lack
of a reason.
Illustration: Alice and Bob live in different places of the same country and only meet every
two or three weeks in person for discussing about the government’s handling of human rights.
However, they perform a regular online communication to intensify their exchange. Recently,
both experienced that e-mails sent by Alice to Bob are not arriving in Bob’s inbox (and vice
versa). After an analysis they discover that only e-mails without illicit opinions arrive in each
other’s inbox. Alice and Bob suspect that a government organization may actively block their
e-mails.
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Phase 1: Formation of a Will
An individual reaches phase 1 when she forms the will for performing a steganographic com-
munication. A will is formed either in a self-driven manner, i.e. if the individual possesses
the necessary know-how about steganography, or if the use of steganography is suggested by a
peer and the individual starts to consider to use it. In general, a will can only be formed after
an initial interest in steganography was created. However, interest in something must first be
triggered and then maintained before it can emerge and eventually become well-developed (the
related process is described in a four-phase model by Hidi and Renninger [12]).
Reasons not to Reach Phase 1: An individual does not reach phase 1 if there is a reason
but no will for using steganography. Several reasons are imaginable for an individual not to
form a will to use steganography, including but not limited to the following reasons:
• unconsciousness about the steganography-application reason and thus the fact of being
phase 0 at all;
• acceptance of the fact that a communication may be observed or manipulated (acceptance
of the reason that caused phase 0);
• lack of interest in steganography, i.e. the interest was maybe not triggered or was not
maintained, so that it could not develop [12];
• similarly to a lack of interest, the individual possibly has a lack of motivation for using
steganography, i.e. security is a less important concern in comparison to a functioning
communication for the individual (a similar reason was provided in other research for
not using the PGP encryption software [37]);
• lack of knowledge about the existence of steganography itself;
• consideration of steganography as inappropriate (e.g. rejection of a protection that relies
on any form of security by obscurity [21, 20]3);
3Due to the introduction of steganographic keys [1, 3, 23], Kerckhoffs’ Principle of security only relying on a
key can be applied to steganography as well. However, this fact is not necessarily known to an individual.
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• negative perception of the value of steganography (in the context of the reason from
phase 0);4
• lack of understanding and lack of experience with steganography as a technology – this
may be linked to a lack of feedback as was pointed out for the case of the PGP encryption
software [37];
• fear of detection when a known steganography method is used;
• lack of trust into the potential peer [5](Chapter 1);
• lack of similarity between the individual and her peer(s): Smaldino et al. state that
pairs of similar individuals can more effectively coordinate and understand their covert
signalling; however, this aspect is limited to non-technical covert communication [29] and
would thus mostly apply to linguistic steganography;
• use of an alternative technology (e.g. Tor -based onion routing [9]) instead of steganog-
raphy caused by the reason in phase 0.
Illustration: Fearing an observation, Alice considers to perform a communication that is not
solely encrypted but hidden from an observer. She forms the will to use steganography for her
communication with Bob.
Phase 2: Suggestion to a Peer
In most cases, at least one peer is required for the individual to exchange of covert information
with. For this reason, in phase 2, the individual suggests the application of steganography to
a peer. This is also the first phase where a coordination with a peer is a necessity.
Reasons not to Reach Phase 2: A reason not to reach phase 2 is if a peer is required for the
steganographic communication but the individual rejected her own will to suggest the use of
steganography. A possible reason is the awareness that (one of) the desired peers(s) would be
unable to use steganography.
4For instance, Devaraj et al. have shown that the value of anonymity, which is another discipline of Informa-
tion Hiding [21], differs significantly depending on several social and cultural aspects such as gender, race,
education and income level [8]. This may be applicable to steganography, too.
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Phase 2 is also not reached if the application of steganography was suggested by a peer to
the individual (phase 1) and no other peers are required to be suggested to use steganography.
Another reason is the case when steganography is applied by the individual to store and
retrieve covert data only with herself. For instance, filesystem steganography [2, 19] may be
used on a local computer by only one individual to store and access own secret data. However,
a single individual’s will is only sufficient for applying steganography if the individual is both
the sender and receiver of all covert information exchange caused by the reason of phase 0.
In such cases where no (additional) peer is required, phase 2 is not considered and phase 1
directly leads to phase 3.
Illustration: At their next physical meeting, Alice suggests Bob to use steganography for their
communication.
Phase 3: Decision to use Steganography
Phase 3 is reached if all necessary participants decided to apply steganography for their com-
munication.
In Simmons’ Prisoner’s Problem, phases 1–3 are merged in brief statements (the prisoners
want to perform a covert communication and they accept the condition to exchange mes-
sages over the warden). However, the process of suggesting the use of steganography to each
prisoner’s peer is missing and the formation of the will is not discussed but just made.
Reasons not to Reach Phase 3: This phase is not reached if one necessary peer rejected the
suggested use of steganography. The phase is also not reached if, e.g. due to a blocked network
communication or the impossibility of a physical meeting, no communication channel can be
used to suggest the use of steganography (i.e., step 2 failed).
Illustration: In the previous phase, Alice suggested Bob to use steganography. However, Bob
never heard of steganography. He is sceptic and prefers to use PGP instead. However, Alice
convinces Bob to use steganography for their communication as this could prevent to raise
suspicion at the observer. They decide to additionally encrypt all secret messages before they
are embedded into a steganographic carrier.
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Phase 4: Communication (Steganography Application)
Finally, the participants perform their covert communication. They first initiate their covert
communication. This is achieved by selecting a steganographic system [36]. Therefore, they
either buy or download one of the steganography software or hardware tools (e.g. those listed
in [31] or that can be found via an online search) from the Internet or a store. Alternatively,
they can implement an own steganography system. They eventually exchange steganographic
keys and finally use their steganographic system. The general process of using steganography
is exemplified with image steganography in [40]. The communication phase happens within a
spectrum reaching from simple steganography, e.g. LSB manipulation in a single image file [14]
or simple forms of linguistic steganography [21], to state-of-the-art methods, e.g. adaptive
steganography methods for network steganography [18] or advanced methods for digital media
steganography. The technical options and their details for performing steganographic commu-
nications are well addressed by several of the already cited references. However, as we highlight
a human-oriented aspect, technical details are not in our focus.
Reasons not to Reach Phase 4: Phase 4 is not reached if due to (technical) reasons, a
covert communication cannot be established. Possible reasons are the presence of a warden
that modifies or blocks the carrier (e.g. digital images [7] or network packets [10]) on the
communication path between the participants. In this case, the individual will either stop
using her steganographic system or will re-try using the steganographic system at a later time.
Alternatively, the individual and the peers may select another steganographic system or switch
to an alternative anti-censorship technology.
Illustration: During their meeting, Alice and Bob decide to use three different tools for
steganography: two tools utilize digital images and one hides secret data in network trans-
missions. To test, whether one of the three tools will be blocked, they send and reply one
message with each tool – similar to a TCP three-way-handshake. Back at home, Alice sends
an e-mail with two photos generated by tools #1 and #2 to Bob and, in addition, she transfers
steganographic network traffic to him with tool #3. Bob receives the messages and answers
on the following day with the same three methods. Alice receives all three acknowledgement
messages and confirms the receipt of all the messages with a single message using one of the
10
three tools. From now on, Alice and Bob use only one tool at a time, knowing that it will be
likely that all three tools will pass the observation.
Phase 5: Desired Termination
Finally, after the participants finished their exchange of secret data, they terminate their
covert communication. Several steganographic protocols describe how connections (sessions)
are (initiated and) terminated in a technical way, e.g. using simple start and stop flags [24].
From the individual’s perspective, however, this means to end the current utilization of a
steganographic system (e.g. in form of a tool). Optionally, the individual can remove the
related tool that implements the steganographic system as well as the related digital files or e-
mails from her computer or from a server; she can moreover destroy hardware components and
any type of evidence that would point an adversary to the fact that she used steganography.
The elimination of evidence could be represented in a ‘Phase 6’ but does not appear necessary
as it is an optional task.
Reasons not to Reach Phase 5: This desired termination phase is not reached if the com-
munication was terminated in an undesired way, e.g. due to network problems or because an
adversary/observer terminated the communication. The handling of the situation would be
the same as in case of the desired termination (e.g. optional removal of the tool, related digital
files, and destruction of evidence for the use of steganography).
Illustration: For a summer break, Bob will be out of the country. Alice and Bob decide to
stop their steganographic communication and may start a new discussion in autumn.
4 Discussion
After the previous section introduced our model, we now discuss certain additional aspects of
it, including potential drawbacks.
General Discussion
When we discuss why an individual cannot or does not want to use steganography, a fundamen-
tal aspect should be mentioned: although knowledge on steganography was kept secret for a
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long time, textbooks and other publications are publicly available since decades. Publications
and web-based discussions on steganography moreover increase continuously since years.5 For
this reason, we cannot assume that steganography is not widely used in public due to a lack
of ‘early adopters’ as defined by [25]. Instead of being a mainstream technology, steganogra-
phy is seen as a niche technology used only for special circumstances. In our model, those
circumstances provide the reasons to enter phase 0.
In addition, the increase of scientific publications during the last decades does not necessarily
influence the extend in which steganography is used because there can be large time-gaps
between the publication of scientific ideas (and even re-inventions of the same) and their actual
application [28]. However, our model shows several reasons that can prevent the application
of steganography by an individual. Especially a broad range of reasons already influences
whether phase 1 will be reached.
In our model, the duration of a phase is not defined; it can reach from seconds to years. Each
phase can be exited either based on an own decision (except for phase 0) or due to external
circumstances (e.g. a blocked communication channel that leads to an undesired termination
of a covert communication).
Our model contains several conditions that describe when a certain phase is not reached.
The individual, at these points, can either stay in the previous phase or can go back to any
earlier phase, including phase 0. For exiting phase 0, two scenarios must be distinguished: If
phase 0 was entered due to an external reason, maybe even unknowingly for the individual
(e.g. due to unnoticed surveillance), it is not foreseen that the individual can exit the model
own her own will unless the reason for phase 0 is not present anymore. If, on the other hand,
the reason for entering phase 0 was self-defined, e.g. for the self-defined purpose of teaching
steganography in a class, the individual can eliminate this reason at any time, thus exit the
model.
Phase 0 may be enforced for literally every Internet user by default as every user could face
surveillance. As it would be impossible to define a threshold to enter phase 0 (the exact extend
of surveillance may not be known or measurable at all), researchers working with the model
should define a plausible reason to enter phase 0 in dependence of an individual’s circumstances.
5A keyword search for the term ‘steganography’ on Google Scholar revealed an average yearly increase of
26.75% of publications that match the keyword for the years 1995-2015.
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For instance, more reasons would be plausibly linkable to a phase 0 for a government-criticizing
journalist than for most other citizens.
Potential Drawbacks
It is important to emphasize that our model is not designed to be static. Instead, it can be
modified by any researcher in new research publications if options for the model’s improvement
are identified.
Although our proposed model was conducted in a meticulous process, it is not necessarily
complete. It is imaginable that we did not consider a special or rare scenario for our model,
especially as one design principle was to keep the model untangled. Such a special case is
possibly integratable into the model – either in an existing phase of the model or by introducing
a new phase. For instance, the decision of not having a ‘phase 6’ – as pointed out in the
description of phase 5 – was to keep the model compact. However, one might argue that such
a ‘phase 6’ would be beneficial due to reasons which we did not consider.
Moreover, our model does not consider detailed psychological aspects and it does not focus
on the usability of steganographic tools. Following our design goals, these aspects were not
intended to be part of this work.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We present a phase model that provides a human-oriented perspective on the application of
steganography. Our phase model adds several aspects to the discussion of applying steganog-
raphy that were not considered in detail before. Starting with the provision of a reason for
a covert communication, the model leads through all necessary steps in a structured manner
until a desired termination of the covert communication is reached. Scientific publications
can use our model to tell which phases they consider in their work and to analyse whether
additional phases could be considered as well. In addition, the model can serve as a tool to
teach the process of steganography-application to students.
Future work may comprise to analyse the usability of steganography tools and to determine
design rules for their improvement. Such a research could be conducted in similar ways as it
was done for cryptographic software, authentication concepts or web-based security tools.
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